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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Weinstein submits this Brief in reply to the Brief of Little America. 
Ms. Weinstein stands by her analysis of Utah law, and its application to the instant dispute, set 
forth in her Opening Brief. She seeks to refrain from repeating the arguments, regarding the 
correctness of which she remains confident, that are set forth in that Opening Brief, and to 
limit this Reply Brief essentially to the parts of Little America's analysis, and non-analysis, 
that may fairly require reply. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. LITTLE AMERICA HAS ESSENTIALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT 
CREATED AND MAINTAINED A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON ITS 
PROPERTY. 
Much of Little America's analysis (see, e.g., Little America's Brief at 17) has to 
do with the inability of pedestrian users of the Little America premises to see the "hot spots" 
created in the re-sealing process: 
If the hot spot were dangerous, it was only because it was invisible. If it 
were invisible, it was incapable of perception by the reasonable land-
owner. In which case, Ms. Weinstein wins the battle, loses the war. 
Id. The clear and by Little America essentially uncontested weight of the evidence is that 
there were, indeed, numerous "hot spots" on the premises. Although Little America does not 
discuss such things in its analysis, there were other locations on the subject premises (the 
entirety of which received the same sealant treatment in the late summer or early fall of 1990) 
on which other people slipped and fell, or nearly fell, in the same general time period that 
Ms. Weinstein did. Little America says nothing about the experience of Boston lawyer Bruce 
Parker or his colleague (discussed in Ms. Weinstein's Opening Brief at 27), or of the second 
slip experienced by Sandra Walraven in a different spot from the one on which she fell 
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(discussed by Ms. Weinstein in her Opening Brief at 25-27), or of the slip and fall incident 
involving Jean Grabb (discussed by Ms. Weinstein in her Opening Brief at 28-30). 
Ms. Weinstein submits that Little America's focus, as suggested by the concept 
of ''perception," quoted, above, from Little America's Brief, is misguided. For, as laid down 
in Jury Instruction No. 16, quoted by Ms. Weinstein in her Opening Brief at 42 and by Little 
America in its Brief at 7, 
A business property owner, such as Little America, has the duty to make 
its property reasonably safe for its guests, such as Ms. Weinstein, and 
the duty to refrain from creating and maintaining dangerous conditions 
on its property. 
(Emphasis added.) Little America errs in its analysis, set forth in the unnumbered footnote 
appearing at page 7 of its Brief, that "Ms. Weinstein did not request an instruction on the 'no 
notice' variant to premises liability," and that "no such instruction was given by the Court." 
For the first paragraph of Instruction No. 16, which sets forth the duty to refrain from creating 
and maintaining dangerous conditions, especially when read in conjunction with the following 
sentence appearing in Instruction No. 17 - "Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to 
act" (emphasis added) — makes it clear that Little America had a duty, standing alone from 
notice, to refrain from creating and maintaining dangerous conditions on its property. The 
heart of Ms. Weinstein's case was and is that Little America created and maintained a 
dangerous condition. Under that prong of premises liability law, whether Little America, the 
creator of the condition, perceived or should have perceived the danger is not relevant. 
With respect to this aspect of the case, this Court should, Ms. Weinstein 
respectfully suggests, ask this question: does the occurrence of situations by the number 
(Mr. Parker's, Mr. Parker's colleague's, Ms. Walraven's, Ms. Weinstein's, and Ms. Grabb's), as 
well as the general situation of invisible "hot spots" essentially acknowledged by Little 
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America to exist, not, fairly speaking, constitute a "dangerous condition" on the Little America 
premises? Alternatively stated, does a situation in which people, by the number, apparently 
doing nothing unreasonable and through no fault of their own, slip and fall and become 
injured, not constitute a dangerous condition? The evidence in this case unequivocally 
supports the predicates suggested in the foregoing questions, and Ms. Weinstein suggests that 
this Court should conclude that the condition was, indeed, dangerous and that, pursuant to the 
district court's instructions, the evidence in support of the contrary conclusion reached by the 
jury was, in the words of the Utah Supreme Court in Sharp v. Williams. 915 P.2d 495, 497 
(Utah 1996), "so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust/' 
This Court should, on the creation and maintaining dangerous condition prong 
of Ms. Weinstein's case, reverse and remand for a new trial. 
B. THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS THAT THE 
DANGEROUS CONDITION WAS "DISCOVERABLE" BY LITTLE 
AMERICA IN THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE CARE. 
As explained in the foregoing part A of this Argument, the duty to refrain from 
creating and maintaining a dangerous condition is severable from Little America's duty, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, to discover the danger and its consequent duty physically to 
correct the dangerous condition or give Ms. Weinstein reasonable warning of it. If, however, 
for some reason, this Court determines that it is necessary, regardless of the trial court's 
instructions,1 to reach the issue, this Court should conclude that the jury's apparent 
lMs. Weinstein notes that Little America has not even attempted, in its Brief, to counter 
Ms. Weinstein's Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(6)-based argument (discussed at 
pages 2-3, 9-10, and 41-43 of her Opening Brief), that the jury's verdict was "against law" (the 
law laid out in the jury instructions). 
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determination that the danger was not "discoverable by {Little America} in the exercise of 
reasonable care/'2 also ran afoul of the above-quoted Sharp v. Williams standard. 
As pointed out in Ms. Weinstein's Opening Brief at 25-26, Sandra Walraven, a 
casualty manager representative for Union Pacific, slipped and fell and was injured (apparently 
on an invisible "hot spot," like the one that did Ms. Weinstein in), a week before 
Ms. Weinstein's incident. Little America has suggested that there was nothing unreasonable 
about its failure to discover the danger on the premises in the aftermath of the Walraven 
incident and, apparently, that it would be asking too much of a premises owner to do such 
things as coefficient-of-friction testing (which, by Little America's acknowledgement, would 
have made clear the difference in slipperiness from one spot to another), in the aftermath of 
the Walraven incident. It never occurred to Little America (see, e.g., testimony of Little 
America's safety and security director, John Stoner, discussed at page 31 of Ms. Weinstein's 
Opening Brief) to have any kind of an expert (a safety engineer, for example) come to check 
things out in the aftermath of the Walraven incident, to see whether there might be a problem 
with the premises, even though Little America had no basis to support the proposition that 
Ms. Walraven had done anything careless. Nor did Mr. Stoner speak with Little America's 
Rick Mills (the man that headed up the asphalt resealant project) regarding any possible safety 
concerns in the aftermath of the Walraven incident. Mr. Stoner acknowledged that, if he had 
seen someone slip on the Little America premises, he would have taken steps to correct the 
2The balance of Instruction No. 16, quoted by Ms. Weinstein at page 42 of her Opening 
Brief and by Little America page 7 of its Brief, is that, if the danger is discoverable by the 
owner in the exercise of reasonable care, "it is the duty of the owner to correct the dangerous 
condition or to give reasonable warning, to the guest, of the danger." It is clear beyond cavil, 
on the facts of this case, that Little America did absolutely nothing to correct the condition 
and gave no warning whatsoever, to Ms. Weinstein or anyone else, of the danger. 
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condition (Tr. at 222) and that if, for the sake of discussion, there had been three or four 
incidents that all occurred at exactly the same spot on the Little America premises, he 
(Mr. Stoner) would acknowledge that there was a hazardous condition that needed to be 
corrected (Tr. at 202). Mr. Stoner was aware that Mr. Mills and his crew were doing, in 
connection with the re-sealing project of August or September of 1990, essentially the same 
thing throughout the entire premises (id). All he, and all Little America, did, regardless of 
these facts, was an eyeball checking (id at 203) into the Walraven incident. Indeed, he 
initially checked the wrong spot in connection with Ms. Walraven's incident (id at 455). 
In connection with this history, and in the face of the second paragraph of 
Instruction No. 16, Ms. Weinstein respectfully suggests that this Court should ask the 
following question: was the danger that beset Ms. Walraven, clearly the same danger that 
beset Ms. Weinstein, ''discoverable by the owner in the exercise of reasonable care"? 
(Emphasis added.) The answer to this question seems unequivocally to be "yes." Reasonable 
care seems clearly to entail Little America's ability to discover the existence of the "hot spots." 
If it required, in the seven days between the Walraven incident and the Weinstein incident, the 
hiring of a qualified expert (Little America undertook to hire two separate experts in the 
defense of this litigation), that would not, in the interest of invitee and public safety, 
Ms. Weinstein suggests, be too much to ask of Little America. Because the danger was 
indeed discoverable in the exercise of reasonable care and because, as explained in footnote 2, 
supra, Little America did nothing to correct the dangerous condition or to give reasonable (or 
any) warning of the danger, this Court should rule that the jury's verdict should not be allowed 
stand. 
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C. THERE IS NO RULE 59(a)(6) EVIDENTIARY SIGNIFICANCE TO THE 
MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVES HEARSAY STATEMENT 
THAT NOTHING NEED BE DONE TO THE SEALANT AFTER IT IS 
APPLIED. 
Little America attempts to make something of the fact, discussed in its Brief at 
2 and 15, that the representative of the manufacturer of the sealant reportedly told the Little 
America testifying expert, Craig Smith, that nothing need be done to the sealant after it is put 
down. That statement by the manufacturer's representative is hearsay, to the extent that it was 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and this Court should not, for purposes 
pertinent hereto, give it any weight. Ms. Weinstein did not object to Dr. Smith's recounting of 
his reported conversation with the manufacturer's representative, knowing that the district court 
would allow it, under Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as support for any opinion that 
the testifying expert, Dr. Smith, might offer. But, for the purpose that Little America brings it 
to this Court's attention (evidence supposedly in support of the jury's verdict), this Court 
should give it no consideration whatsoever. 
D. DR. SMITHS OWN EXPERIENCE IN THE HOME IN WHICH HE HAD 
BEEN LIVING FOR MANY YEARS SHOULD BE GIVEN NO CONSID-
ERATION. 
Little America asks the Court, in its Brief at 4-5, to give weight to Dr. Smith's 
testimony that he had not slipped, in his own home, when stepping from a carpet to a 
hardwood floor, even though there was a difference in coefficient of friction approximately the 
same as the difference measured by Dr. Wille (a non-testifying expert of Little America) a 
year and a half after the subject incident occurred. Little America apparently brings this 
testimony to the Court's attention to support the proposition that the difference in coefficient of 
friction measured by Dr. Wille does not necessarily estabUsh a dangerous situation. The Court 
should here take note of two important facts: first, that there is a decided difference in 
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appearance between a carpeted floor and a hardwood floor (similar, perhaps, to what appears 
to a pedestrian between a wintertime expanse of dry sidewalk versus a spot of snow or readily 
apparent ice, and unlike the invisible differences between the hot spots and the other parts of 
Little America pedestrian walking surfaces commented on by numerous witnesses in this 
case); and second, that Dr. Smith was talking about familiar surfaces in his own home (in 
contradistinction to Ms. Weinstein's experience in a precise area that she had, by all accounts, 
never traversed prior to the time of the subject incident). This Court should, Ms. Weinstein 
respectfully suggests, give no weight to this part of Dr. Smith's testimony in its analysis of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
E. LITTLE AMERICA HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY CONTESTED 
MS. WEINSTEIN'S CONTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT COURTS 
EXCLUSION OF HER CONVERSATION WITH THE DESK CLERK 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Little America gives short shrift (see its Brief at 20-21) to Ms. Weinstein's 
contention (see, especially, Ms. Weinstein's Opening Brief at 43-47) that the district court 
committed reversible error in excluding her proffered testimony regarding the "that happens all 
the time" conversation she had with the Little America desk clerk. Little America brings no 
authority to the Court's attention in an attempt to counter Ms. Weinstein's reliance on Rules 
401, 403, and 102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, or her discussion of E.L. Kimball and R.N. 
Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 1996, at 8-26, or her analysis of the case of McGill v. Frasure, 
790 P.2d 379 (Idaho App. 1990). Nor does Little America address Ms. Weinstein's alternative 
contention that the district court should have allowed the testimony in question as being 
offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but as impeachment evidence. By the 
time Ms. Weinstein sought to introduce the subject testimony, and as explained in her Opening 
Brief at 45-46, Little America had presented testimony that suggested that the incidents 
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experienced by the handful of persons whose names came up at trial were the only slip and 
fall incidents that had occurred on the premises. Indeed, Little America's own strong reliance 
(see page I of its Brief) on the testimony of Al Landvatter (its risk manager), that well over 
100,000 people had successfully traversed the subject premises in the relevant time period, 
suggests, given Little America's own theory of this case, the importance of the testimony in 
question. 
As pointed out in her Opening Brief at 44-45, Ms. Weinstein acknowledges that 
Little America could have vigorously cross-examined her on her lack of knowledge of the 
name of the person and of the ambiguity inhering in the person's statement: "Oh, that [people 
slipping and falling on the Little America pavement] happens here all the time." Little 
America could also have vigorously argued to the jury that there was ambiguity in that 
statement and, if it had so chosen, that Ms. Weinstein was fabricating the statement. These 
things do not, however, render the statement inadmissible, especially in the circumstances of 
this case and when the dangerousness of the Little America premises was central to 
Ms. Weinstein's theory of the case. The statement was not hearsay, and it should have been 
admitted, under either Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence or as basic impeach-
ment evidence. The district court committed reversible error in excluding the proffered 
evidence. 
HI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
There was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, either under the 
"dangerous condition" prong of Instruction No. 16, or under the "discoverable ... in the 
exercise of reasonable care," prong of that Instruction. Given the entirety of the evidence 
presented to the jury, the evidence of non-negligence was so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. Under Jury Instruction No. 11, uncontested 
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by Little America, the scales of evidence were clearly tipped, "however slightly or greatly" in 
favor of Ms. Weinstein with respect to the proposition that Little America was negligent. 
The district court committed reversible error, in the circumstances of this case, 
in excluding Ms. Weinstein's proffered testimony regarding her conversation with the desk 
clerk. 
The Court should reverse the district court and remand this action for a new 
trial. 
-a£r 
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